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THE TERRORIST THREAT
Ansar al-Sharia is the most prominent Salafist 
jihadist organization in Tunisia which was 
established in April 2011. In the beginning, the 
movement, which sympathizes with the ideology of 
al-Qaeda, focused its attention on humanitarian 
and missionary works. Later it did not balk using 
violence to enforce the religious norms. The 
conflict between the Ennahda Government and 
the organization culminated between May and 
July, 2013. In the end, the Government designated 
Ansar al-Sharia as terrorist-organization at the 
end of August 2013. According to the official 
reports, the organization is responsible for 
planning several unsuccessful attempts during 
the intervening months. Therewith Okba bin 
Nafaa, the military wing of Ansar al-Sharia, has 
been fighting an open war with Tunisian Army 
near the Algerian border region since December 
2012.
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Introduction
The Salafist jihadist movements have 
strengthened significantly in Tunisia after the 
2011 Arab Spring. The Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia 
(AST), the most prominent local organization, 
came into existence three months after the 
collapse of Ben Ali’s regime. The movement, 
which unreservedly sympathized with the 
ideology of the international al-Qaeda terror-
organization, laid emphasis on works of mercy 
and the dawa, which meant missionary activity in 
the beginning. After months, it has been took full 
advantage of the critical economic conditions of 
the country and the social tensions that originated 
from the previous situation. It did not flinch away 
from using the hisba, the enforcement of Islamic 
doctrines with violence, to achieve its purpose. 
The conflict between the Ennahda majority 
government and the organization culminated in 
May-July, 2013. Finally, the cabinet declared 
the Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization at 
the end of August. According to governmental 
sources, the organization tried to make attempts 
on several occasions during the elapsed time. 
The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, the military wing 
of the organization, nowadays is fighting an open 
war with the Tunisian Armed Forces alongside 
the Algerian border region.
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1. The establishment of Ansar al-Sharia
The Salafist Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of 
Islamic Law) was set up by Abu Iyad al-Tunisi 
(or Seifallah Ben Hassine) in Soukra, one of 
the suburbs of Tunis, at the end of April, 2011. 
From the beginning its openly declared aim was 
to provide services that according to his point of 
view, the government was incapable to provide. 
The precise structure of the organization has 
been unknown until now. We only know that it 
was built up by a network. The latter consisted 
of smaller local groups and its structure was like 
a pyramid.1
There was not any reliable information 
about the exact size of the organization, because 
membership was regularly undervalued by the 
governmental authorities and overestimated by 
the supporters. The first adherents came mainly 
from the working-class in Bab al-Khadra as well 
as al-Kambes and Malik bin Anas Mosques. The 
popularity of the AST grew dynamically in a short 
time due to its intensive campaign and religious 
activities in the local mosques. In a little while, 
the base of the AST attracted mainly desperate 
youths who were disappointed in the revolution 
and the regime.2
From the beginning the organization 
emphasized the importance of propaganda to 
pass its message to a wide mass of people. It 
established the al-Qayrawan Media Foundation 
(QMF) on April 27, 2011 to popularize its 
ideology and work. It ran its own blog and created 
Facebook pages as well as it regularly published 
different presses.3
1 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a 
Member of Ansar al-Sharia” in Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, 
available online at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/
index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-
member-of-, accessed on August 01, 2014.
2 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia’s Nascent 
Democracy” in The Washington Institute, Improving the 
Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy, December 8, 2011. 
available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-salafi-challenge-to-tunisias-
nascent-democracy, accessed on July 28, 2014.
3 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Rise of Salafists in Tunisia After the 
Fall of Ben Ali” in Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point, Augustus 01, 2011, available online at: https://www.
ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-salafists-in-tunisia-after-
the-fall-of-ben-ali, accessed on July 31, 2014.
Officially it covered its expenses from 
donations that mainly Tunisian locals offered 
in the mosques during the Friday preaching. 
The works of mercy were also sponsored by 
prominent foreign – mainly Saudi and Kuwaiti 
– foundations.
Besides the activity on behalf of the 
community, it made an intensive campaign to 
demand the release of well-known Islamist 
prisoners. In addition, it held peaceful sit-ins 
on several occasions outside the Iraqi embassy 
in Tunis and in front of the Tunisian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on behalf of Tunisian activist of 
al-Qaeda, who were imprisoned in Iraq during 
2005–2007.4
The name of the organization also shows 
that the main objective of the Ansar al-Sharia 
is to appear the sharia strongly in everyday 
life. The ideas of AST about the new Tunisia 
were manifested at a nation-wide conference in 
Kairouan on May 20, 2012.5
Ansar al-Sharia supported unreservedly the 
ideology of international al-Qaeda network about 
global jihad. Despite the ideological identification, 
in the beginning, the group concentrated vitally 
on recruiting local volunteers and providing 
missionary activities (dawa). AST considered 
its main duty to return to the right way and to 
strongly enforce Islamic values in everyday life. 
The long-term aim of the organization was the 
re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.
The Ansar al-Sharia emphasized several times 
that its aim is not to acquire power. It did not want 
to accede in internal politics so it did not set up 
an own legal party. It condemned the state and 
4 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia’s Nascent 
Democracy” in The Washington Institute, Improving the 
Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy, December 8, 2011, 
available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-salafi-challenge-to-tunisias-
nascent-democracy, accessed on July 28, 2014.
5 This occasion Abu Iyad urged the reform of the media, 
tourism and commercial sectors in accordance with 
Islamic principles. He also felt necessary to create 
an Islamic trade union to counteract the powerful 
and secularist Tunisian General Labour Union. (Lin 
Noueihed, “Radical Islamists urge bigger role for Islam 
in Tunisia” in Reuters, May 21, 2012, available online 
at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/tunisia-salafis-
idINDEE84K03420120521, accessed on July 29, 2014.
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democracy and in the distributed pamphlets it 
pronounced the participation in political life as a 
polytheist act. In addition, AST regularly posted 
fatwas and videos from popular Salafi jihadist 
sheiks arguing against democracy in order to 
deter potential voters from the poll.6
Another important aspect was the rejection 
of violent jihad in Tunisia besides the radical 
interpretation of Islam. This statement was not the 
result of the weakness of Salafi jihadist tendency 
that could not previously strengthen in Tunisia. 
At the same time we also have to add to the 
non-violent-statement that in this case Ansar al-
Sharia only rejected the open fight with external 
enemies of the Islam religion in Tunisia. We have 
to emphasize this, because the main aims of the 
organization were the missionary activities and 
the so-called hisba, which meant an avoidance of 
forthcoming wrong.7
The homemade dawa did not prevent Abu 
Iyad from supporting violent jihad in foreign 
countries. This is why he created a dual strategy 
in the interest of keeping on non-violence and 
alleviating tensions in Tunisia. He offered an 
opportunity of choice for his fellows to decide 
who wanted to do peaceful missionary works 
at home. The others, who wanted to fight, were 
sent to Syria, Libya or Mali.8 In his country he 
endeavored consistently to make real Islamic 
6 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia’s Nascent 
Democracy” in The Washington Institute, Improving the 
Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy, December 8, 2011, 
available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-salafi-challenge-to-tunisias-
nascent-democracy, accessed on July 28, 2014.
7 In practice this means making observations of religious 
norms in the Muslim community. According to their 
interpretation this entitled them to attack and assault persons 
and institutions in necessity that violated regulations. 
(Daveed Gartenstein-Ross – Bridget Moreng – Kathleen 
Soucy, “Raising the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s 
Shift to Jihad” ICCT Research Paper, February 2014. p. 
4; Sarah Leah Whitson, “Letter to Tunisian Minister of 
Interior and Minister of Justice” in Human Rights Watch, 
14 October 14, 2012, available online at: http://www.hrw.
org/es/node/110818. accessed on August 05, 2014).
8 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Saria” in The 
Middle East Channel, March 08, 2013, available online at: 
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/08/
meeting_tunisias_ansar_al_sharia, accessed on July 23, 
2014.
moral mainly with verbal persuasion and 
exemplary behavior in the population.
Influential theorists of the movement 
are Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the 
Palestinian writer with Jordanian citizenship, 
Sheikh al-Khatib al-Idrissi, who is one of the 
most prominent Salafi clerics in Tunisia, the 
imprisoned Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the Syrian 
Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Anwar al-Awlaki, who 
were killed in the end of September, 2011, or 
Hani Sabahi.9
In practice, the organization’s aim was to 
offer concrete choices for daily challenges 
and tribulations in accordance with Islam. For 
example, AST often organized presentations for 
gaining minds and hearts. On these performances 
notable Tunisian scholars popularized the thought 
of returning to Islamic values. In addition, it 
regularly distributed the works of the Salafist 
literature among the people on the weekly 
market, the activist cleaned the streets in public 
works, they nursed elder locals in their homes, 
they carried out many humanitarian actions in the 
refugee camps as well as in the region afflicted by 
natural disaster, and the organization helped those 
in need with donations of food, medicine and 
clothes in the backward countryside areas, which 
were previously neglected by the government. 
AST took maximally the advantages of the 
opportunities of modern age to form a wide 
supporting base. This is why AST continuously 
reported its activity on the internet which was 
illustrated by photos.10
2. Warning signs
There were many warning signs from 2011 
referring to the will of the Salafists to enforce their 
Islamist minds and rebuild the state to their own 
face as soon as possible despite several occasions 
9 Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a 
Member of Ansar al-Sharia” in Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, 
available online at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/
index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-
member-of-, accessed on August 01, 2014.
10 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Saria” in The 
Middle East Channel, March 08, 2013, available online at: 
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/08/
meeting_tunisias_ansar_al_sharia, accessed on July 23, 
2014.
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of non-violent declarations. The first serious 
conflict between the government and Ansar 
al-Sharia occurred on June 26, 2011. Several 
dozens of AST activists demonstrated on Habib 
Bourguiba Avenue against the Tunisian film “No 
God, No Master” that outspokenly criticized 
political Islam. The demonstrators broke into a 
movie hall where they crushed the equipment. 
The police arrested seven people, but about 100 
Salafist activists had been demanding the release 
of their detained fellows two days later in front 
of the Justice Ministry. The protesters attacked 
five lawyers and one of the latter ones was 
taken to hospital. After the incident, the interim 
government determined to crush the Islamists and 
arrested 26 people, among them several Ansar al-
Sharia’s members.11
Three months later the tempers got out of 
control again due to another film, Persepolis, the 
Oscar-nominated film. Abu Iyad encouraged his 
fellows against Nessma private television channel 
after it had broadcasted the film on October 7, 
2011. The next day the Islamists tried to set fire 
to the TV station and the channel owner’s home 
was raided.12
By this time, the demonstrations in the capital 
happened ordinarily on behalf of women in 
universities wearing niqab, which covers their 
whole body. The protesters attacked the riot 
policemen who tried to dissolve them with tear-
gas with sticks, stones and knives. Shortly, the 
street disturbances also spread to the universities. 
The Salafist activists attacked secular minded 
students and a little group of undergraduates 
led by Mohamed Bakti practically kept Habib 
11 Andrew Hammond; Tarek Amara, “Tunisia Islamists 
Arrested After Clashes in Capital” in Reuters, June 28, 
2011, available online at: http://af.reuters.com/article/
algeriaNews/idAFLDE75R14C20110628?pageNumber
=1& virtualBrandChannel=0, accessed on July 31, 2014; 
Adrew Hammond, “„No God” film angers Tunisian 
Islamist” in, Reuters, July 06, 2011, available online at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/us-tunisia-
islamists-tension-idUSTRE7652VZ20110706, accessed 
on July 28, 2014.
12  Ben Child, “Islamist protesters attack Tunisian TV station 
over animated film Persepolis” in The Guardian, October 
10, 2011, available online at: http://www.theguardian.
com/film/2011/oct/10/islamist-protesters-attack-tunisian-
persepolis, accessed on July 28, 2014.
Kazdaghli, the dean of University Manouba 
as hostage in his office for weeks in order to 
force him to give permission to wear niqab in 
classrooms and on exams.13 The influence of 
religious extremism was clearly and alarmingly 
manifested on March 16, 2012. Thousands of 
Islamist protesters demonstrated in front of the 
building of Constituent National Assembly in 
Tunis under al-Qaeda’s typical black banner 
where they demanded the acknowledgement of 
sharia as the fundamental source of law in the 
future constitution.14 Nine days later, the flag 
appeared again in the downtown of Tunis where 
an originally peaceful demonstration started 
organized by Ansar al-Sharia for glorifying 
Koran. The demonstrators took one with them to 
the top of the clock tower near one of the busiest 
crossroad of the capital where they demanded the 
establishment of a new caliphate. Unfortunately 
the violence did not fail on this occasion 
either. This time the participants interrupted a 
performance in front of a theater of the capital 
when they attacked and maltreated the members 
of the company.15
In La Marsa, one of Tunis’s suburbs, other 
disturbances broke out on account of an art 
exhibition on June 12, 2012. The temper got out of 
control after the assault of the gallery. Thousands 
13 Rob Prince, “Tunisia culture wars: the case of Habib 
Kazdaghli, Dean of the University of Tunis-Manouba” in 
Open Democracy, Free thinking for the World, July 26, 
2012, available online at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/
rob-prince/tunisia-culture-wars-case-of-habib-kazdaghli-
dean-of-university-of-tunis-manouba, accessed on July 28, 
2014; Jacopo Salvadori, “Tunisia – Niqab and woman’s 
activism: the Tunisian March 8” in DAO Online, News and 
Informations from Kuwait and the World, March 08, 2012, 
available online at: http://www.daoonline.info/ news_dett_
eng.asp?ID=1127, accessed on July 28, 2014.
14 John Rosenthal, “Tunisian Salafists Demonstrate for 
Sharia under Al Qaeda Banner” in National Review 
Online, March 21, 2012, available online at: http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/294103/tunisian-salafists-
demonstrate-sharia-under-al-qaeda-banner-john-rosenthal, 
accessed on July 28, 2014.
15 Ahmed Ellali, “Several Thousand Salafists Demonstrate 
for Islamic Law, Attack Dramatists in Tunis” in Tunisia 
alive, living Tunisia, March 25, 2012, available online at: 
http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/25/several-thousand-
salafists-demonstrate-for-islamic-law-attack-dramatists-
in-tunis/, accessed on July 29, 2014.
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of protesters set fire to the offices of the country’s 
main labour union in Jendouba, burned a local 
court in west Tunis and threw rocks and Molotov 
cocktails at several police stations. At the end of 
the riots, 65 members of the security forces were 
wounded and 162 people were detained.16
The turning-point with long-term consequences 
occurred on September 14. The demonstrations 
began after Friday prayers on account of a 
film which portrayed the Prophet Mohammad 
engaged in vulgar and offensive behavior. The 
disturbances quickly spread in the capital when 
Ansar al-Sharia endorsed the rallying call on 
Facebook by Islamist activists. The protesters 
marched in front of the U.S. embassy in Tunis 
with sticks, stones and petrol bombs where they 
forced their way into the building and started to 
plunder it systematically. Certain persons hauled 
down the U.S. flag from the embassy, burned it, 
and replaced it with the black flag of Islam while 
others carried off the values. Luckily, no one 
from the American embassy’s staff was hurt due 
to the quick arrival of the riot police though the 
aggressors resolutely stood on the defensive in 
the beginning. Their resistance ended when the 
police used live cartridge. During this time, their 
fellows broke into a nearby American School. 
They set aflame the building after they took 
away laptops and computers. On this occasion 
the clashes required serious casualties: minimum 
29 persons got injured and two others lost their 
lives.17
The assassination of the well-known left-
wing secular minded Chokri Belaid on February 
6, 2013 was another example of declining public 
security throughout the country. Disturbances 
broke out after the opposition leader’s death 
16 “Tunisia shaken by ‘Islamist protests’” in BBC News, 
June 12, 2012, available online at: http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-africa-18416327, accessed on July 28, 2014; 
“Tunisia: Conservative Islamists Riot Over Art Exhibit” in 
The New York Times, June 12, 2012, available online at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/ 13/world/africa/tunisia-
conservative-islamists-riot-over-art-exhibit.html, accessed 
on July 28, 2014.
17 Tarek Amara, “Two dead as protesters attack U.S. embassy 
in Tunisia” in Reuters, September 14, 2012, available online 
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-protests-
tunisia-school-idUSBRE88D18020120914, accessed on 
July 28, 2014.
which someone used to plunder. However the 
police arrested the majority of these persons 
in a short time, Ansar al-Sharia found that the 
time had come to set in its private army, called 
Neighborhood Committees. The activists, as self-
appointed vigilantes, patrolled on streets in 10–
50 member groups waving al-Qaeda black flag to 
provide justice arbitrarily against anyone whose 
behavior they regarded substandard. Although the 
crisis-situation passed with few scuffles and the 
arrestment of a thief, the patrols’ presence made a 
big impression on locals who were disappointed 
with the cabinet’s policy. This and the social 
activity for public welfare together showed 
explicitly that AST would soon form a separate 
state inside the Tunisian state. Ennahda had to do 
something, because the co-operation grew larger 
between the party’s hard-line elements and AST 
due to the concessions made to the secularists in 
the writing of the constitution.18
3. The proscription of the Movement
In the beginning, the moderate Islamist 
Ennahda adopted an extremely tolerant policy 
towards Ansar al-Sharia after winning the 
National Assembly elections on October 23, 
2011. It took the initiative and suggested a 
national dialogue with Salafist. With this step 
it trusted in preventing the radicalization of 
fundamentalists who meant a dangerous threat 
with their illegality and commitment to terror-acts 
in the long run. However, the positive proposal 
affected inconsiderably the Jihadist movement, 
because several members approached Ennahda 
with some skepticism from the beginning. In 
spite of positive efforts the first conflicts had been 
already occured in 2011 when Ennahda made 
a non-Islamist parties’ coalition. The situation 
became more and more critical in 2012. The 
number of Salafist demonstrations increased on 
the streets where the marchers protested against 
18 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Night’s Watch: Ansar al-Shari’ah in 
Tunisia’s ‘Neighborhood Committees’” in al-Wasat – الوسط, 
The Muslim world, radicalization, terrorism, and Islamist 
ideology. February 11, 2013, available online at: http://
thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/02/11/the-nights-watch-
ansar-al-shariah-in-tunisias-neighborhood-committees/), 
accessed on July 29, 2014.
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governmental policy with violent acts. At the end 
of December the cabinet offered a new dialogue 
for those Salafist groups which rejected violence. 
At the same time for emphasizing the importance 
of gesture it stressed that it was not willing to 
negotiate with those ones who disturb public 
order and promised serious sanctions against 
them.19 The relation between Ennahda and Ansar 
al-Sharia worsened; because the same ideological 
aspects of the movement with al-Qaeda and 
its wide missionary activities soon became 
suspicious. In governmental circles it caused 
growing anxiety how AST could recruit adherents 
in such extremely respectable numbers during a 
short period.20 The Abna’kum fi Khidmatikum’s 
(Your Sons Are at Your Service) activity mainly 
impressed those people who became disillusioned 
by the government’s policy. These people more 
and more saw the care they previously expected 
from government in AST.
As the charity works of the organization 
became known throughout the country, in 
the beginning, the government targeted its 
propaganda. Their Facebook-profile was banned 
12 occasions between September 2012 and 
March 2013, with no effect. The movement 
emerged again and again to inform its fellows 
continuously.21 After the attack on the US 
embassy, the cabinet was forced to accept the 
demand of the political opposition and numerous 
Jihadist persons, among them several Ansar 
19  “Two years on since revolution, Tunisia struggles with 
new political realities” in Al Ahram Online, January 14, 
2013, available online at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/2/8/62468/World/Region/Two-years-on-
since-revolution,-Tunisia-struggles-w.aspx, accessed on 
July 31, 2014.
20 It was a clear indication of the organization’s considerably 
increasing popularity that only a few hundred people 
attended the 2011 conference whereas the participants’ 
number reached 10 000 people one year later. (Mohammad 
Abu RUMMAN – Hassan Abu Haniya, “Ansar al-Sharia: 
Al-Qaeda’s Response to Arab Spring” in Al-Monitor, 
January 07, 2013, available online at: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/01/history-ansar-al-
sharia-arab-spring.html#, accessed on July 31, 2014.
21 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Saria” in The 
Middle East Channel, March 08, 2013, available online at: 
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/08/
meeting_tunisias_ansar_al_sharia, accessed on July 23, 
2014.
al-Sharia members, were detained to restrain 
extremists. However, many imprisoned Salafists 
began hunger-strikes as a protest against the 
considered unjust procedure. Two of them died 
in prison in November. So the cabinet did not 
succeed in shattering Islamists, but gave martyrs 
to their movement unwittingly.22
Despite the growing danger, the government 
still bewared of openly confronting with Ansar 
al-Sharia whereas several members of the 
organization evidently participated regularly in 
demonstrations against blasphemous issues and 
acts. According to the authorities’ suspicions, 
others did more and they were related with many 
violent incidents and weapon smuggling in 
March 2013. However, they could not prove the 
charges for a long time, so the organization could 
work further. Then the security forces bore down 
on members of the organization without any 
kind of warning on 10-11 May, who distributed 
their books and pamphlets on the streets. In 
response, Abu Iyad threatened the government 
to give up his peaceful standpoint and broke out 
an open violent jihad against it.23 In its reaction, 
the cabinet banned Ansar al-Sharia’s imminent 
annual congress. The membership of the 
organization was infinitely indignant at decision 
and its motive. The disaffected persons already 
clashed openly with security forces in Tunis 
and Kairouan on May 19. The protesters threw 
stones and Molotov cocktails to the policemen, 
set fire to an armored vehicle, attacked one of the 
posts of National Guard, closed roads, burned 
a national flag and plundered. The government 
gave up its tolerant rhetoric once and for all after 
the clashes that caused at least one protester’s 
death and 15 policemen’ injury. Prime Minister 
Ali Larayedh openly declared Ansar al-Sharia an 
22 Noureddine Hlaoui, “Salafist Hunger Strikers Die in 
Tunisian Prison” in Al-Monitor, November 26, 2012, 
available online at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/
politics/2012/11/salafist-hunger-strikers-die-in-tunisian-
prison.html, accessed on August 04, 2014.
23 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Standoff Between the Tunisian 
Government and Ansar al-Sharia” in The Washington 
Institute, Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle East 
Policy, May 14, 2013, available online at: http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-salafi-
challenge-to-tunisias-nascent-democracy, accessed on 
August 04, 2014.
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illegal organization and for first time he spoke 
about AST’s alleged terrorist ties and activities 
when he commented on the events.24
The oppositionist Mohamed Brahmi’s 
death on July 25, 2013 and the following mass-
demonstrations this time meant turning-point. 
On 27 August, Prime Minister Ali Larayedh 
announced at a press conference that Ansar al-
Sharia was provably the mastermind behind 
killing Brahmi and Chokri Belaid and held them 
responsible for the internal crisis.25 To the murder 
of the two politicians he added that the murderers 
were senior leaders of AST who committed their 
act with Abu Iyad’s knowledge and approval. 
So he justified the terrorist designation of the 
organization as part of the international al-Qaeda 
network which trained its volunteers in Libya 
and Syria as well as got its financial support from 
Arabic countries, like Yemen, Libya or Mali.26 
He charged them with supporting the armed 
jihadist cell which was active in the Algerian–
Tunisian border region and was the target of the 
army for a month around Mount Chaambi. Next 
day, the Director of Public Security supplied the 
information that the secret military wing of the 
organization provably planned assassinations 
24  Roula Khalaf, “Tunisia has finally turned up the heat on 
the Salafis” in Politics & Society, May 20, 2013, available 
online at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b4e8ab2-c14f-11e2-
9767-00144feab7de.html#axzz3935abQ3H, accessed 
on July 31, 2014; Antoine Lambroschini, “Tunisia PM 
vows firm action after unrest” in The Daily Star Lebanon, 
May 20, 2013, available online at: http://www.dailystar.
com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/May-20/217720-
tunisia-salafist-leader-says-group-cannot-be-defeated.
ashx#axzz2UDe2JhBI, accessed on August 04, 2014.
25 According to police sources, both assassinations were 
provably carried out with the same gun that they seized 
during a raid. (“Ansar al-Sharia blamed for Tunisia killings” 
in Al-Jazeera, August 27, 2013, available online at: http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/2013827131811
488516.html, accessed on August 01, 2014.
26 Later Ansar al-Sharia linked to that group which exploded 
on the vehicles of National Guard in La Goulette in July. 
The police managed to arrest two of the perpetrators in 
Marnaguia in September. During the raid the authorities 
seized many home-made bombs and TNT explosives in 
considerable quantity. (“Tunisia: Two Terrorists Arrested, 
Weapons Seized in Mornaguia – Interior” in Tunis Afrique 
Presse, September 28, 2013, available online at: http://
allafrica.com/ stories/201309300977.html, accessed on 
August 01, 2014).
against 19 public figures.27
In its response, announced on September 3, 
the organization denied the charges and stressed 
its independence and innocence. It found the 
terrorist designation as “honor” and threatened 
the “tyrants”, who ruled Tunisia, to start a war.28 
Abu Iyad was accused of instigating the besieging 
mass over the U.S. embassy and a warrant of 
arrest was issued against him; therefore he fled to 
illegality after the embassy’s attack. Nowadays, 
he is supposedly staying in Libya where he 
enjoys the protection of Abdelhakim Belhadj, a 
former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
commander.29
The United States of America also accepted 
the standpoint of the Tunisian cabinet in relation 
to Ansar al-Sharia in the beginning of 2014. 
According to their judgment, the organization 
became the most dangerous threat against 
American interests in Tunisia. This is why they 
designated the group and its leader as terrorist on 
January 10.30
27 YASM, “Tunisia: Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar Al-Sharia, 
Tunisia Reveals” in Magharebia, August 29, 2013, available 
online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201308300788.html, 
accessed on August 01, 2014.
28 Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar al Sharia responds to Tunisian 
government” in The Long War Journal, September 03, 
2013, available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2013/09/ansar_al_sharia_tuni_6.php, accessed on 
August 01, 2014; MTI, “Ezentúl terroristának számítanak 
Tunéziában az Anszar as-Saría tagjai” in HVG, August 27, 
2013,. available online at: http://hvg.hu/vilag/20130827_
tunezia_terrorista_szervezet, accessed on July 23, 2014.
29 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross; Bridget Moreng, “Tunisia’s 
War with Ansar al-Sharia: New Revelations about Al-
Qaeda’s North African Network” in War on the Rocks, 
October 21, 2013, available online at: http://warontherocks.
com/2013/10/tunisias-war-with-ansar-al-sharia-new-
revelations-about-al-qaedas-north-african-network/, 
accessed on August 01, 2014.
30 “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari’a 
Organizations and Leaders” in U.S. Department of State 
Diplomacy in Action, January 10, 2014, available online 
at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219519.htm, 
accessed on July 24, 2014; Robert JOYCE, “US declares 
Ansar al-Saria a Terrorist Organisation” in Tunisia alive, 
living Tunisia, January 10, 2014, available online at: http://
www.tunisia-live.net/2014/01/10/us-declares-ansar-al-
sharia-a-terrorist-organization/, accessed on July 24, 2014.
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4. The end of non-violent policy
The jihadist cell, hiding in the Mount 
Chaambi region, identified by the Tunisian 
authorities as Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade and AST 
were accused of co-operation. The exact structure 
and the size of the terror-group are unknown as 
well as its leadership. Nowadays, it seems that 
it is composed at least of two serrya (company) 
that are built up rather flexibly. The crackdown 
on the group is very probable, because injured 
militants were taken away immediately by their 
companions during clashes. If the latter was 
impossible, they decapitated the bodies to avoid 
identification. They also hid booby-traps under 
the abandoned bodies to cause further damages 
to security forces.31
The cell, which numbered about 20 jihadist 
fighters in May 2013, was composed mainly 
of foreign volunteers from the neighboring 
countries – primarily Algerians and Libyans – 
in the beginning. The situation worsened when 
Ennahda increasingly turned against Salafist 
groups and reached out to secular opposition 
parties as a compensation of extremists. In its 
response, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb issued 
a statement on March 17, 2013 urging Tunisian 
volunteers in foreign countries to return home 
and turn back unfavorable processions against 
religion. Many Tunisian veterans, who fought 
earlier in Iraq and/or Syria, traveled back to their 
country where they joined Okba Ibn Nafaa as 
well as set up another group, estimated of 12–15 
persons, in the area of el-Kef 160 kilometers to 
the north.32
According to the signs, from the beginning the 
group was closely linked to terrorist-organization 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. According to 
Interior Minister Ali Larayedh’s announcement 
in December 2012, the cell was under the 
leadership of three Algerians, who were in close 
31 Mohamed Kasdallah, “Terrorists in Tunisia Adopt 
‘Asymmetric’ Warfare Tactics” in Al-Monitor, November 
11, 2013, available online at: http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/security/2013/11/tunisia-terrorists-asymmetric-
warfare.html#, accessed on August 05, 2014.
32 Paul Schemm, “Jihadis threaten Tunisia’s Arab Spring 
transition” in AP, July 31, 2013, available online at: http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/jihadis-threaten-tunisias-arab-
spring-transition, accessed on July 31, 2014.
relationship with Abdelmalek Droukdel, leader 
of al-Qaeda’s North-African wing. He said that 
in the beginning their main goal was to set up 
camps in the Kasserine region, where recruits 
could get initial training before sending them 
to one of al-Qaeda’s base in Algeria or Libya.33 
Later, his notification was justified by the 
terrorists, who were equipped with Kalashnikovs, 
heavy weapons and sniper rifles. They used – 
and are using nowadays too – the same tactic 
in their raids around Mount Chaambi that al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb practiced in the 
Kabylie mountains against the Algerian army: 
raiding by surprise against mountainous hardly 
approachable military posts, then torturing the 
bodies of the soldiers and finally looting their 
weapons and military dress.34
The terrorist-group, which was named after 
the Umayyad general, first appeared in the 
horizon of the authorities at the end of 2012. In 
December, four armed men killed adjutant Anis 
Jelassi in shoot-out in Kasserine Governorate. 
The Tunisian authorities began a wide-scope 
investigation and arrested seven people. On the 
basis of their confession, Interior Minister Ali 
Rayadh delineated for first time the exact name 
of the cell, its contact with al-Qaeda as well as its 
smuggling and secret military training activity on 
December 21.35
33 He also stated that the members of the group were 
inhabitants of Kasserine region and Ansar al-Sharia 
volunteers. His statement, which meant an open charge 
against a legally working organization, was lacked any 
kind of proof. That is why many people questioned the 
authenticity and precision of the notification (Andrew 
Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s jihadists” in The Middle 
East Channel, May 16, 2013, available online at: http://
mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/
confronting_tunisias_jihadists, accessed on August 01, 
2014).
34 “Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade” in TRAC, Terrorism Research 
& Analysis Consortium. (http://www.trackingterrorism.
org/group/okba-ibn-nafaa-brigade) accessed on August 01, 
2014.
35 Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s jihadists” in 
The Middle East Channel, May 16, 2013, available online 
at: http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/ 
05/16/confronting_tunisias_jihadists, accessed on August 
01, 2014; Amira Masrour, “Circumstances of Death Arise 
After Algerian Border Attack” in Tunisia Live, living in 
Tunisia, December 11, 2012, available online at: http://
www.tunisia-live.net/2012/12/11/circumstances-of-death-
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Following the case when a road-sided bomb 
shattered one patrolling soldier’s leg in the 
National Park, the Tunisian Army launched a 
military offensive to eliminate them. Practically, 
there was no direct armed contact with the group 
in the first half of the two-month action. The 
terrorists always escaped after they undermined 
the place. The Army’s only solution against this 
was using mortar fire against dangerous areas. 
During the operation, which was executed by 
several hundred soldiers, three persons died and 
27 were injured due to the 10 explosions against 
them.36
Certainly the armed forces caused serious 
damages to the terrorists, but they did not 
succeed to eliminate them completely. The cell 
struck again in Mount Chaambi in July 2013. 
They killed eight soldiers and cut the throats of 
five of them. The armed forces launched a new 
wide-range offensive against them as revenge, 
but the offenders managed to escape also on this 
occasion.37
5. Open jihad against security forces
After the proscription of the organization, the 
Tunisian authorities started an intensive hunt for 
Ansar al-Sharia and Islamist militants. During 
2013 alone, 1,347 persons were brought to justice 
in connection with terrorist-related charges, and 
more than 8,000 young men and women were 
prevented from going to Syria to fight.38 During 
arise-after-algerian-border-attack/, accessed on August 05, 
2014.
36  At the same time it was thoughtful that none of the 
detained dozens of suspects almost certainly belonged 
to the hiding jihadists. (Paul Schemm, “Jihadis threaten 
Tunisia’s Arab Spring transition” in AP, July 31, 2013, 
available online at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/jihadis-
threaten-tunisias-arab-spring-transition, accessed on July 
31, 2014; “Tunisia links two wanted jihadist groups to al-
Qaeda” in AFP, May 7, 2013, available online at: http://
english.alarabiya.net/ en/News/africa/2013/05/07/Tunisia-
links-two-wanted-jihadist-groups-to-al-Qaeda-.html) 
accessed on July 29, 2014.)
37  “Tunisia declares Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist group” in 
BBC News, August 27, 2013, available online at: http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23853241, accessed on 
July 25, 2014.
38 Yasmin Najjar, “Tunisia takes out top terrorists” in 
Magharebia, February 05, 2014, available online at: http://
magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/02/05/
a police raid in the Raoued area outside Tunis, 
Kamel Gadhgadhi, the main suspect of Chokri 
Belaid’s assassination, was killed along with six 
other terrorists. It was thought-provoking that the 
security forces found a large quantity of weapons 
during the rummage of the building. It indicated 
that the terrorists probably planned to carry out 
an attack.39 Another six members of the banned 
organization were detained by the anti-terrorist unit 
in the centre of Sidi Bouzid on July 10. Two weeks 
later, they arrested Mohamed Anis, “the Princes 
of Ansar al-Sharia”, who possessed considerable 
cash and documents containing terrorist plans.40 
According to the reports, the security forces 
killed several other members of the organization 
in October. Due to their intervention, the suicide 
attempt against French and American embassies 
also failed at the end of the month, which was 
ordered by Abdelmalek Droukdel to sleeping cells 
of Ansar al-Sharia as a revenge for French military 
action in Mali and the liquidation of al-Qaeda 
leaders. They also managed to disarm the suicide 
bomber who wanted to blow up the mausoleum 
of Habib Bourguiba in Monastir with considerable 
quantity of explosives in his rucksack on October 
30. Unfortunately, they could not prevent his 
companion from committing action. His bomb, 
which was hidden in a suitcase, was activated by a 
mobile phone on the beach outside the Riad Palm 
Hotel in Sousse on the same day.41 Luckily, the 
feature-01, accessed on July 29, 2014.
39 Ibid.
40 The actual influence of the banned organization was 
well pictured that the companions of the July arrested 
activists started a spontaneous demonstration at the police 
headquarters and demanded their release on the same day. 
The police used tear gas and fired warning shots to disperse 
the mob. Also on the same day, Salafist extremists clashed 
with policemen in El Kef. They threw stones at police 
vehicles and attacked the police station with Molotov 
cocktails. (“Ansar al-Sharia clash with Sidi Bouzid 
police” in Magharebia, July 11, 2014, available online at: 
http://magharebia.com/ en_GB/articles/awi/newsbriefs/
general/2014/07/11/newsbrief-03, accessed on July 29, 
2014; Yosr Kzadri, “The Arrest of the Prince of Ansar al-
Sharia Mohammed Anis in Mahdia” in Tunisia Times, July 
24, 2014, available online at: http://tunisiatimes.tn/en/news/
the-arrest-of-the-prince-of-ansar-al-sharia-mohammed-
anis-in-mahdia, accessed on July 29, 2014).
41 Thomas Joscelyn, “Suicide bomber strikes in Tunisia” in 
The Long War Journal, October 30, 2013, available online 
at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/nine_
members_of_ansa.php, accessed on August 04, 2014.
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suicide assailant did not hurt anybody else. 
Soon after these events, the Tunisian 
authorities began a wide-range investigation. 
Shortly, they arrested five persons and confiscated 
a considerable quantity of explosives in Monastir. 
The suspects told during their interrogation that 
they planned an attempt according Abu Iyad’s 
order against the center of the security services, 
police stations as well as four supermarkets, 
where alcohol could be bought.42 The security 
services managed to discover another attempt 
when they arrested a terrorist cell. Supposedly, 
the six terrorists wanted to target hotels or bars 
on the popular tourist site Djerba Island during 
New Year’s Eve celebrations.43
At the same time, despite the unquestionable 
significant results, the struggle against terrorism 
proved to be a remarkable challenge for the 
Tunisian armed forces. The low experience 
meant a serious problem as well as the lack of 
sufficient equipment. Their position worsened 
when they had to divide their small strength and 
regroup forces to the Libyan border region that 
became dangerous after the turn in the country. 
What is more, the militants slew at least 15 
soldiers or policemen until October 2013 and 
killed two policemen in Beja about 160 km north 
of the Chaambi region on October 15, 2013. The 
security forces lost their confidence in the cabinet 
due to growing casualties. Their unions organized 
several demonstrations where they demanded to 
make the needed resources available to combat 
jihadist elements as well as laws to protect 
policemen.44
42 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross; Bridget Moreng, Kathleen 
Soucy, “Raising the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s 
Shift to Jihad” ICCT Research Paper, February 2014. 
p.16.
43 Monia Ghanmi, “Tunisia Thwarts New Suicide 
Bombing” in All Africa, December 10, 2013, available 
online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201312110409.
html?viewall=1, accessed on August 05, 2014.
44 The growing disaffection of policemen was exceedingly 
exemplified on October 18, 2013, when they did not allow 
President Moncef Marzouki, Prime Minister Ali Larayedh 
and parliamentary speaker Mustapha Ben Jaafar to attend 
the funeral ceremony for the two comrades, who were 
killed three days earlier by extremists. (“Tunisia leaders 
evicted from police memorial” in Al-Jazeera, October 
18, 2013, available online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/africa/2013/ 10/tunisia-leaders-evicted-from-police-
memorial-20131018135840923875.html, accessed on July 
The danger of terrorism increased on January 
14, 2014 when Okba Ibn Nafaa merged with 
Ansar al-Sharia whereby it was non-officially 
transformed to al-Qaeda’s Tunisian wing. 
Abdelmalek Droukdel, the Algerian chief of al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, appointed Khaled 
Chaieb (aka Lokman Abou Sakhr) as the leader of 
the new organization that was very soon referred 
to in the press as al-Qaeda in Tunisia. From 
the experience of the past half a year, it seems 
that Chaieb managed to recruit and train new 
volunteers meanwhile he managed all the time 
to avoid capture. The militants, equipped with 
rocket-propelled grenades and rifles, raided again 
and made an assault on two military checkpoints 
near Mount Chaambi on July 17, 2014. The 
casualties – 15 soldiers lost their lives and at 
least 20 other wounded in the attack – were the 
heaviest death toll registered by the armed forces 
since independence in 1956.45 After the events, 
the government set up a crisis group and closed 
the unlicensed Al-Ensan television and Nour 
Radio stations, as well as certain mosques, which 
they claimed that they had promoted violence and 
jihad.46 Above all, the Tunisian cabinet intensified 
its cooperation with neighboring Algeria and 
they launched a joint operation to catch Islamists. 
Despite the preventive measures, another raid 
occurred on July 26, when some 40 Islamists 
ambushed two vehicles of the armed forces near 
Djebel Urgha, in Kef Governorate. In response 
to the attack, which caused two soldiers’ death 
and four others injured, two days later, the armed 
forces reacted quickly and arrested more than 10 
persons of perpetrators.47
29, 2014).
45 “Tunisian soldiers killed in attack near Algerian border” 
in BBC News, July 17, 2014, available online at: http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28341318, accessed on 
July 24, 2014.
46 Safa Ben Said, “Ask the Experts: Are Media Closures 
a Threath to Freedoms?” in Tunisia alive, living Tunisia, 
July 22, 2014, available online at: http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2014/07/22/ask-the-experts-are-media-mosque-
closures-a-threat-to-freedoms/, accessed on July 28, 2014.
47 M.G., “Le Kef: Plusieurs arrestations en rapport avec 
l’embuscade de Jebel Ouergha” in Business News, July 28, 
2014, available online at: http://www.businessnews.com.
tn/le-kef--plusieurs-arrestations-en-rapport-avec-lembus-
cade-de-jebel-ouergha,520,48310,3, accessed on July 29, 
2014.
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Conclusion
We can see in the study how the relations 
between Ansar al-Sharia and the Tunisian 
government worsened step-by-step. The main 
reasons were many successive incidents as 
well as mutual responses and reactions. We can 
consider Anis Jelassi’s killing in December 2012 
as the beginning of the war against the state. The 
raids against soldiers together with the set-back 
of public order caused a considerable pressure to 
the cabinet until the politician Mohamed Brahmi’s 
death in July 2013 as well as the killing of eight 
members of security forces some days later. 
The Tunisian cabinet got into a tight corner and 
without any kind of a choice it had to designate 
Ansar al-Sharia as terrorist-organization and 
declared an open struggle against it.
Today, there are many factors that spelt 
difficulties in the fight against terrorists. The 
jihadists look like normal inhabitants with 
their appearance and clothes and enjoy the 
local’s maximum support. They build up close 
cooperation with local smugglers in hardly 
controlled mountainous regions so there is no 
special problem for them in gaining reserves. 
The police lost its prestige after the fall of Ben 
Ali’s regime so now the armed forces’ main task 
is to eliminate them. At the same time, we can 
not wonder that this proved to be an enormous 
challenge for them with securing public 
institutions and keeping public order as well as 
controlling several hundred kilometers borderline 
and fighting against terrorists. The problem is 
heightened by the lack of such technological 
resources (e.g. enough airplanes and helicopters 
or suitable bugs for reconnaissance) that could 
compensate for the disadvantages in their number. 
It looks like that without effective measures, all 
of the risk that jihadist activists can set up their 
own basis in the region, where they can train their 
common ideological volunteers in untroubled 
conditions who will be deployed later against 
the institutions and represents of Tunisian state 
seems to transform into a real threat.
The failed attempts in the second half of 2013 
also resulted in misgivings. Namely, the selection 
of targets implies that the terrorist-organization 
accepted Jamal al-Islamiyya’s previous tactic 
when it wanted to force its conception upon 
state by attacking tourism. Using this strategy 
practically means the loss of the main public 
revenue needed as soon as possible for the state 
to stabilize the critical economic conditions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
AMARA, Tarek, “Two dead as protesters 1. 
attack U.S. embassy in Tunisia”, Reuters, 
September 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/14/us-protests-tunisia-school-
idUSBRE88D18020120914, accessed on July 
28, 2014.
CESARI, Jocelyne, “2. The Awakening of 
Muslim Democracy. Religion, Modernity, and 
the State”. Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2014.
CHILD, Ben, “Islamist protesters 3. 
attack Tunisian TV station over animated film 
Persepolis”, The Guardian, October 10, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2011/oct/10/
islamist-protesters-attack-tunisian-persepolis, 
accessed on July 28, 2014.
ELLALI, Ahmed, “4. Several Thousand 
Salafists Demonstrate for Islamic Law, Attack 
Dramatists in Tunis”, Tunisia alive, living 
Tunisia, March 25, 2012, http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2012/03/25/several-thousand-salafists-
demonstrate-for-islamic-law-attack-dramatists-
in-tunis/, accessed on July 29, 2014.
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed; 5. 
MORENG, Bridget, “Tunisia’s War with 
Ansar al-Sharia: New Revelations about Al-
Qaeda’s North African Network” War on the 
Rocks, October 21, 2013, http://warontherocks.
com/2013/10/tunisias-war-with-ansar-al-sharia-
new-revelations-about-al-qaedas-north-african-
network/, accessed on August 01, 2014.
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed; 6. 
MORENG, Bridget, SOUCY, Kathleen, “Raising 
the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Shift to 
Jihad.” ICCT Research Paper, February 2014.
GHANMI, Monia, “Tunisia Thwarts 7. 
New Suicide Bombing” All Africa, December 10, 
2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201312110409.
html?viewall=1, accessed on August 05, 2014.
THE TERRORIST THREAT
148 STRATEGIC IMPACT  No. 1/2015
HAMMOND, Andrew; AMARA, Tarek, 8. 
“Tunisia Islamists Arrested After Clashes in 
Capital” Reuters, June 28, 2011, http://af.reuters.
com/article/algeriaNews/idAFLDE75R14C2011
0628?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0, 
accessed on July 31, 2014.
HAMMOND, Andrew, “„No God” 9. 
film angers Tunisian Islamist” Reuters, 
July 06, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/07/06/us-tunisia-islamists-tension-
idUSTRE7652VZ20110706, accessed on July 
28, 2014.
HLAOUI, Noureddine, “Salafist Hunger 10. 
Strikers Die in Tunisian Prison”, Al-Monitor, 
November 26, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/ar/politics/2012/11/salafist-hunger-
strikers-die-in-tunisian-prison.html, accessed on 
August 04, 2014.
JOSCELYN, Thomas, “Ansar al Sharia 11. 
responds to Tunisian government”, The Long 
War Journal, September 03, 2013, http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/ansar_
al_sharia_tuni_6.php, accessed on August 01, 
2014.
JOSCELYN, Thomas, “Suicide bomber 12. 
strikes in Tunisia”, The Long War Journal, 
October 30, 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2013/10/nine_members_of_ansa.
php, accessed on August 04, 2014.
JOYCE, Robert, “US declares Ansar al-13. 
Saria a Terrorist Organisation”, Tunisia alive, 
living Tunisia, January 10, 2014, http://www.
tunisia-live.net/2014/01/10/us-declares-ansar-al-
sharia-a-terrorist-organization/, accessed on July 
24, 2014.
KASDALLAH, Mohamed, “Terrorists in 14. 
Tunisia Adopt ‘Asymmetric’ Warfare Tactics”, 
Al-Monitor, November 11, 2013, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/11/tunisia-
terrorists-asymmetric-warfare.html#, accessed 
on August 05, 2014.
KHALAF, Roula, “Tunisia has finally 15. 
turned up the heat on the Salafis”, Politics & 
Society, May 20, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/6b4e8ab2-c14f-11e2-9767-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3935abQ3H, accessed on July 31, 
2014.
KZADRI, Yosr, “The Arrest of the Prince 16. 
of Ansar al-Sharia Mohammed Anis in Mahdia”, 
Tunisia Times, July 24, 2014, http://tunisiatimes.
tn/en/news/the-arrest-of-the-prince-of-ansar-al-
sharia-mohammed-anis-in-mahdia/, accessed on 
July 29, 2014.
LAMBROSCHINI, Antoine, “Tunisia 17. 
PM vows firm action after unrest”, The Daily 
Star Lebanon, May 20, 2013, http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/May-
20/217720-tunisia-salafist-leader-says-group-
cannot-be-defeated.ashx#axzz2UDe2JhBI, 
accessed on August 04, 2014.
LEBOVICH, Andrew, “Confronting 18. 
Tunisia’s jihadists”, The Middle East Channel, 
May 16, 2013, http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2013/05/16/confronting_tunisias_
jihadists, accessed on August 01, 2014.
MASROUR, Amira, “Circumstances 19. 
of Death Arise After Algerian Border Attack”, 
Tunisia Live, living in Tunisia, December 11, 
2012, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/12/11/
circumstances-of-death-arise-after-algerian-
border-attack/, accessed on August 05, 2014.
MERONE, Fabio, “Salafism in Tunisia: 20. 
An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia” 
Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.
com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-
interview-with-a-member-of-, accessed on 
August 01, 2014.
M.G., “Le Kef : Plusieurs arrestations 21. 
en rapport avec l’embuscade de Jebel Ouergha”, 
Business News, July 28, 2014, http://www.
businessnews.com.tn/ le-kef--plus ieurs-
arrestations-en-rapport-avec-lembuscade-de-
jebel-ouergha,520,48310,3, accessed on July 29, 
2014.
MTI, “Ezentúl terroristának számítanak 22. 
Tunéziában az Anszar as-Saría tagjai”, HVG, 
2013. August 27, http://hvg.hu/vilag/20130827_
tunezia_terrorista_szervezet, accessed on July 
23, 2014.
NAJJAR, Yasmin, “Tunisia takes out 23. 
top terrorists”, Magharebia, February 05, 2014, 
http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/
features/2014/02/05/feature-01, accessed on July 
29, 2014.
THE TERRORIST THREAT
149STRATEGIC IMPACT  No. 1/2015
NOUEIHED, Lin, “Radical Islamists urge 24. 
bigger role for Islam in Tunisia”, Reuters, May 21, 
2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/
tunisia-salafis-idINDEE84K03420120521, 
accessed on July 29, 2014.
PRINCE, Rob, “Tunisia culture wars: the 25. 
case of Habib Kazdaghli, Dean of the University 
of Tunis-Manouba”, Open Democracy, Free 
thinking for the World, July 26, 2012, https://
www.opendemocracy.net/rob-prince/tunisia-
culture-wars-case-of-habib-kazdaghli-dean-of-
university-of-tunis-manouba, accessed on July 
28, 2014.
ROSENTHAL, John, “Tunisian Salafists 26. 
Demonstrate for Sharia under Al Qaeda Banner”, 
National Review Online, March 21, 2012, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/294103/
tunisian-salafists-demonstrate-sharia-under-al-
qaeda-banner-john-rosenthal, accessed on July 
28, 2014.
RUMMAN, Mohammad Abu; HANIYA, 27. 
Hassan Abu, “Ansar al-Sharia: Al-Qaeda’s 
Response to Arab Spring”, Al-Monitor, January 
07, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
politics/2013/01/history-ansar-al-sharia-arab-
spring.html#, accessed on July 31, 2014.
SAID, Safa Ben, “Ask the Experts: Are 28. 
Media Closures a Threath to Freedoms?”, Tunisia 
alive, living Tunisia, July 22, 2014, http://www.
tunisia-live.net/2014/07/22/ask-the-experts-are-
media-mosque-closures-a-threat-to-freedoms/, 
accessed on July 28, 2014.
SALVADORI, Jacopo, “Tunisia – Niqab 29. 
and woman’s activism: the Tunisian March 8”, 
DAO Online, News and Information from Kuwait 
and the World, March 08, 2012, http://www.
daoonline.info/news_dett_eng.asp?ID=1127, 
accessed on July 28, 2014.
SCHEMM, Paul, “Jihadis threaten 30. 
Tunisia’s Arab Spring transition”, AP, July 
31, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/jihadis-
threaten-tunisias-arab-spring-transition, accessed 
on July 31, 2014.
WHITSON, Sarah Leah, “Letter to 31. 
Tunisian Minister of Interior and Minister of 
Justice”, Human Rights Watch, 14 October 14, 
2012, http://www.hrw.org/es/node/110818, 
accessed on August 05, 2014.
YASM, “Tunisia: Al-Qaeda Funds Ansar 32. 
Al-Sharia, Tunisia Reveals”, Magharebia, 
August 29, 2013, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201308300788.html, accessed on August 
01, 2014.
ZELIN, Aaron Y., “The Rise of Salafists 33. 
in Tunisia After the Fall of Ben Ali”, Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, Augustus 01, 
2011, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-
of-salafists-in-tunisia-after-the-fall-of-ben-ali, 
accessed on July 31, 2014.
ZELIN, Aaron Y., “The Salafi Challenge to 34. 
Tunisia’s Nascent Democracy”, The Washington 
Institute, Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle 
East Policy, December 8, 2011, http://www.
washingtoninsti tute.org/policy-analysis/
view/the-salafi-challenge-to-tunisias-nascent-
democracy, accessed on July 28, 2014.
ZELIN, Aaron Y., “The Night’s Watch: 35. 
Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia’s ‘Neighborhood 
Committees’”, al-Wasat – الوسط, The Muslim 
world, radicalization, terrorism, and Islamist 
ideology. February 11, 2013, http://thewasat.
wordpress.com/2013/02/11/the-nights-watch-
ansar-al-shariah-in-tunisias-neighborhood-
committees/, accessed on July 29, 2014.
ZELIN, Aaron Y., “Meeting Tunisia’s 36. 
Ansar al-Saria”, The Middle East Channel, March 
08, 2013, (http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2013/03/08/meeting_tunisias_ansar_
al_sharia, accessed on July 23, 2014.
ZELIN, Aaron Y., “Standoff Between the 37. 
Tunisian Government and Ansar al-Sharia”, The 
Washington Institute, Improving the Quality of 
U.S. Middle East Policy, May 14, 2013, http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/the-salafi-challenge-to-tunisias-nascent-
democracy, accessed on August 04, 2014.
ZELIN, Aaron Y., “Tunis Designates 38. 
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia”, al-Wasat – الوسط, 
The Muslim world, radicalization, terrorism, 
and Islamist ideology. August 28, 2013, http://
thewasat.wordpress.com/category/ansar-al-
shariah-in-tunisia/, accessed on July 28, 2014.
***, “Ansar al-Sharia blamed for Tunisia 39. 
killings”, Al-Jazeera, Augustus 27, 2013, http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/20138
27131811488516.html, accessed on August 01, 
2014.
***, “Ansar al-Sharia clash with Sidi 40. 
Bouzid police”, Magharebia, July 11, 2014, 
http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/
THE TERRORIST THREAT
150 STRATEGIC IMPACT  No. 1/2015
newsbriefs/general/2014/07/11/newsbrief-03, 
accessed on July 29, 2014.
***, “Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade”, 41. TRAC, 
Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, 
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/okba-
ibn-nafaa-brigade, accessed on August 01, 2014.
***, “Terrorist Designations of Three 42. 
Ansar al-Shari’a Organizations and Leaders”, 
U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action, 
January 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2014/01/219519.htm, accessed on July 24, 2014.
***, “Tunisia: Conservative Islamists 43. 
Riot Over Art Exhibit”, The New York Times, June 
12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/
world/africa/tunisia-conservative-islamists-riot-
over-art-exhibit.html, accessed on July 28, 2014.
***, “Tunisia declares Ansar al-Sharia 44. 
a terrorist group”, BBC News, August 27, 
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
23853241, accessed on July 25, 2014.
***, “Tunisia leaders evicted from police 45. 
memorial”, Al-Jazeera, October 18, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/
tunisia-leaders-evicted-from-police-memorial-
20131018135840923875.html, accessed on July 
29, 2014.
***, “Tunisia links two wanted 46. 
jihadist groups to al-Qaeda”, AFP, May 7, 
2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/
africa/2013/05/07/Tunisia-links-two-wanted-
jihadist-groups-to-al-Qaeda-.html, accessed on 
July 29, 2014.
***, “Tunisia shaken by ‘Islamist 47. 
protests’”, BBC News, June 12, 2012, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18416327, 
accessed on July 28, 2014.
***, “Tunisia: Two Terrorists Arrested, 48. 
Weapons Seized in Mornaguia – Interior”, 
Tunis Afrique Presse, September 28, 2013, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201309300977.html, 
accessed on August 01, 2014.
***, “Tunisian soldiers killed in attack 49. 
near Algerian border”, BBC News, July 17, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
28341318, accessed on July 24, 2014.
***, “Two years on since revolution, 50. 
Tunisia struggles with new political realities”, Al 
Ahram Online, January 14, 2013, http://english.
ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/62468/World/
Region/Two-years-on-since-revolution,-Tunisia-
struggles-w.aspx, accessed on July 31, 2014.
THE TERRORIST THREAT
